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property of the estate, and are therefore subject to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.6 It is now
well-settled that under § 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code that “a debtor's liability insurance is
considered property of the estate.”7 Furthermore, “an overwhelming majority of courts have
concluded that liability insurance policies fall within § 541(a)(1)'s definition of estate property.”8
An issue that has arisen is whether the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to protect a debtor’s
interest in its insurance policies through injunctive orders, and guidance has come in several
decisions.
Johns-Manville was formerly a Fortune 500 company that operated mining,
manufacturing, and forest products businesses.9 Johns-Manville is most well-known as the
world’s largest miner and producer of raw asbestos products, selling raw asbestos in 58 countries
and distributing asbestos-based products across a broad range of industries.10 Johns-Manville
then became the center of a number of products liability lawsuits alleging personal injuries as a
result of asbestos exposure.11 This resulted from numerous scientific studies that linked exposure
to asbestos fibers to respiratory conditions, such as lung cancer.12 In the 1980s, Johns-Manville
was named the defendant in over 12,000 lawsuits brought by over 16,000 claimants, with
additional suits being filed consistently, resulting in over 400 new suits every month.13 The
significant source of strain on the company was the possibility of facing tens of thousands of

6

See MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1988).
See In re MF Global Holdings Ltd., 496 B.R. 117, 190 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating it is
well-settled that a debtor's liability insurance is considered property of the estate and whether the
proceeds of a liability insurance policy are property of the estate are guided by the language and
scope of the specific policies at issue).
8
In re Vitek, Inc., 51 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995).
9
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 534 B.R. 553, 556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
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See id.
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See id.
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lawsuits from unknown asbestos victims, as a person exposed to Johns-Manville asbestos may
not develop an identifiable injury for decades.14 As a result of the potential for future liability,
Johns-Manville filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in
August of 1982.15
When Johns-Manville filed its Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, it was entangled in
extensive litigation with its insurance carriers concerning the insurance coverage for asbestosrelated liabilities.16 Johns-Manville entered into settlements with its insurance carriers in order to
avoid insurance litigation and to best fund a reorganization plan.17 A settlement agreement was
reached in which insurers contributed $770 million to a trust benefitting asbestos personal injury
claimants.18 The insurers entered into the settlement under the agreement that, in exchange for
the cash settlement, the insurers would be relieved of all ongoing and future obligations related
to the disputed policies. The insurers secured protection from claims through injunctive orders
from the bankruptcy court.19
Furthermore, the insurers were able to terminate the settlement if the injunctive orders
were not issued or if they were set aside on appeal.20 Pursuant to Rule 9019(a) of the Federal

14

Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 638-39 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting “[a] significant
characteristic of these asbestos-related diseases is their unusually long latency period. An
individual might not become ill from an asbestos-related disease until as long as forty years after
initial exposure. Hence, many asbestos victims remain unknown, most of whom were exposed in
the 1950's and 1960's before the dangers of asbestos were widely recognized. These persons
might not develop clinically observable symptoms until the 1990's or even later.”)
15
Id. (“From the outset of the reorganization, all concerned recognized that the impetus for
Manville's action was not a present inability to meet debts but rather the anticipation of massive
personal injury liability in the future.”)
16
MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F. 2d at 90.
17
See id.
18
See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 534 B.R. at 557.
19
MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F. 2d at 90.
20
See id.
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Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the bankruptcy court approved the settlement.21 The bankruptcy
court issued such injunctive orders, understanding that the orders were an essential part of the
entire reorganization of Johns-Manville.22 The settlement agreement approved by the bankruptcy
court resulted in an order confirming the plan of reorganization (the “Confirmation Order”), and
an additional settlement order (the “Insurance Settlement Order”) together known as the “1986
Orders.”23 Under the 1986 Orders, Johns-Manville and its insurers were released from further
liability, but present and future claimants could claim against the trust.24
This article discusses the possibility of bringing a new cause of action against JohnsManville’s insurers in light of the 1986 Orders. Part I addresses two distinct complaints brought
by two entities, one in the context of a contract claim brought by a distributor of Johns-Manville
asbestos products, and the other in the context of a tort claim brought by a worker who
contracted asbestosis. In both of these scenarios, the respective plaintiffs were barred from
bringing their cause of action as a result of the 1986 Orders. Part II discusses and compares a
direct action complaint brought by groups of plaintiffs against Travelers, one of JohnsManville’s insurers. In this scenario, however, the plaintiffs were permitted to bring their direct
action complaint.
I.

1986 Orders are a bar to future claims against Johns-Manville’s insurers
A. Distributor brings a contract claim
MacArthur Company and Western MacArthur Company (collectively known as

“MacArthur”) was a distributor of Johns-Manville products, and had a vendor endorsement with
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Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a)
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Johns-Manville.25 MacArthur claimed this endorsement entitled itself, as a distributor, to
insurance coverage for product liability resulting from the sale of Johns-Manville products.26
MacArthur contended the bankruptcy court settlement impaired its vendor endorsement rights, as
its “contractual rights could not lawfully be extinguished by the bankruptcy court’s injunctive
orders.”27 The bankruptcy court initially dismissed MacArthur’s objections, in that MacArthur’s
“interest in the policies is highly speculative” and that any claim it had, based on Manville’s
insurance, should have been asserted in the bankruptcy court.28 The district court then affirmed
the orders of the bankruptcy court.29 Importantly, on appeal to the Second Circuit, MacArthur’s
legal argument was based upon its belief that the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction and
authority to enjoin suits against Johns-Manville’s insurers.30
As a debtor’s insurance policies are considered property of their estate, they are subject to
the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.31 In earlier proceedings of the case, the bankruptcy court
found that Johns-Manville’s insurance policies and their proceeds are “substantial property of the
Johns-Manville estate, which would be diminished if, and to the extent that, third party direct
actions against the insurance carriers result in plaintiffs’ judgments.”32 The bankruptcy court
determined that MacArthur’s rights as an insured vendor were derived from Johns-Manville’s
rights as the primary insured.33 Therefore, MacArthur’s derivative rights were no different than
those of asbestos victims, who are also barred from asserting direct actions against John-
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MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F. 2d at 90.
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27
Id. at 90-1.
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See id.
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See id. at 92.
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In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 420, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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See id.
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Manville’s insurers.34 The court ultimately ascertained no difference between rights based in
contract and rights based in tort.35 Regardless of a basis in contract or tort law, the appellate
court determined that a third party would be seeking to collect from the proceeds of the JohnsManville’s insurance policies, based on Johns-Manville’s conduct.36
Because MacArthur’s claims were based upon Johns-Manville’s own insurance coverage,
MacArthur’s claims were determined to be indistinguishable from Johns-Manville’s insurance
coverage.37 Therefore, both were within the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.38 The bankruptcy
court asserted jurisdiction over Johns-Manville’s insurance policies,39 as the insurance policies
were one of the most valuable assets of the estate.40 Therefore, the bankruptcy court also asserted
jurisdiction over MacArthur’s rights as an insured vendor, because they are tied to JohnsManville’s primary insurance policy.41 The bankruptcy court essentially had jurisdiction over
MacArthur’s claims because the claims were inseparable from the insurance coverage. The
Second Circuit then determined that the 1986 Orders by the bankruptcy court were correctly
ordered, as a bankruptcy court had equitable and statutory power to dispose of a debtor’s
property free and clear of any third party interests, and could then channel those interests to the
proceeds that, as a result, were created.42

34

See id.
See id.
36
See id.
37
See id.
38
See id at 93.
39
Id. at 92.
40
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting bankruptcy court was
cognizant that Johns-Manville's insurance policies were the bankruptcy estate's most valuable
asset).
41
MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F. 2d at 92-3 (2d Cir. 1988).
42
See id. at 91.
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MacArthur further contended that it was denied due process as a matter of law because it
received notice of the insurance settlements after the settlements had been negotiated.43
However, MacArthur and all other interested parties were provided with notice and a hearing
before the bankruptcy court approved the settlements.44 In order for the notice to be deemed
sufficient, it must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections,
and must express no opinion on merits of settlement.”45 Beyond these requirements, under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)46 district courts have virtually complete discretion as to the
manner of giving notice to class members.47 The Second Circuit determined that the notice of the
proposed settlements met the requirements of due process.48
B. Asbestos worker brings a tort claim
Mr. Salvador Parra was an individual who, after contracting asbestosis from handling
asbestos, sued certain producers, distributors, and insurers of asbestos products, including JohnsManville and Marsh USA (“Marsh”).49 Marsh is an insurer of Johns-Manville.50 Parra alleged
these parties knew or should have known about asbestos-related health hazards.51 Parra filed suit
in 2009 claiming Marsh had conspired with other industry-related companies to withhold

43

See id. at 94.
See id.
45
Handschu v. Special Services Div., 787 F.2d 828, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1986).
46
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e).
47
See Handschu v. Special Services Div., 787 F.2d 828, 832-33.
48
MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F. 2d at 94.
49
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 534 B.R. at 558.
50
Id. at 557.
51
See id.
44
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information concerning the dangers of asbestos.52 According to Parra, Marsh should be held
liable for “negligent undertakings, conspiracy, aiding, and abetting courses of conduct.”53
Pursuant to the plan of reorganization of Johns-Manville, Marsh contributed $29.75
million to the future claimants’ trust. In exchange, Marsh was relieved of all liability related to
their insurance of Johns-Manville and would be protected from claims via injunctive orders of
the bankruptcy court.54 This settlement agreement was approved by the court, resulting in the
court entering the Confirmation Order and the 1986 Orders.55 Under the 1986 Orders, JohnsManville and its insurers were released from further liability, but present and future claimants
could claim against the trust.56 Part of the settlement agreement included the appointment of a
legal representative by the bankruptcy court, in order to ensure the rights of future claimants.57
Parra alleged that Marsh has a “unique” relationship with Johns-Manville, in that Marsh
functioned as Johns-Manville’s insurance department, beyond operating as just its broker, which
was maintained over a forty-year relationship.58 Marsh filed a motion to enforce the
Confirmation Order (“the Motion”) asserting that Parra’s claims were “squarely within” the
injunction protection in the 1986 Orders.59 The Motion by Marsh requested the bankruptcy court
to enjoin Parra from prosecuting his claims.60 However, Parra believed that in order for Marsh’s
Motion to be procedurally effective, Marsh would have had to file an adversary proceeding, as
per Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(7), arguing that the Motion by Marsh was

52

See id.
Id.
54
See id.
55
See id.
56
See id.
57
See id. at 556-57.
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See id.
59
See id at 558-559.
60
See id. at 559.
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essentially seeking a new injunction.61 In response, Marsh argued that it is not seeking a new
injunction, but rather is seeking to enforce the 1986 Orders,62 in which case an adversary
proceeding would not be required. The bankruptcy court agreed that Marsh did not need to file
an adversary proceeding because the Motion did not seek a new injunction, but only enforcement
of the 1986 Orders.63 The bankruptcy court granted Marsh’s Motion, stating that Marsh was
relieved of all liability, consistent with the Confirmation Order.64
The bankruptcy court interpreted the 1986 Orders, declaring that the determining factor is
not the intent of the parties, but the intent of the issuing court.65 In U.S. v. Spallone, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that a lower court’s interpretation of a
document is restricted to the “four corners” of the document, unless the court must resolve
ambiguities.66 As the Supreme Court had determined that the injunctive provisions of the 1986
Orders were not ambiguous,67 the bankruptcy court construed the language “related to” broadly,
determining that claims against Marsh did relate to Marsh’s insurance coverage of JohnsManville, and were therefore barred by the injunction.68
Another of Parra’s arguments regarded the future claimants’ legal representative, who
represented Parra against Marsh because Parra was a “future asbestos claimant,” and therefore he
fell within the scope of the future claimants’ representative’s mandate.69 Parra contended that the
future claimants’ legal representative may have represented him with respect to his claims
61

U.S.B.R. 7001; In re Johns-Manville Corp., 534 B.R. at 559 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (alleging
Motion is procedurally defective because Marsh failed to file an adversary proceeding).
62
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 534 B.R. at 562.
63
See id. at 562.
64
Id. at 569-69.
65
U.S. v. Spallone, 399 F.3d 415, 424 (2d Cir. 2005).
66
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 534 B.R. at 563-66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
67
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 149-50 (2009).
68
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 534 B.R. at 564-65 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
69
See id. at 566.
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against Johns-Manville itself, but did not represent him with respect to his claims against JohnsManville’s settling insurers, such as Marsh, for their independent misconduct.70 However, the
court found that “limiting the role of the future claimants’ representative would be
inappropriate.”71 The court stated that nothing in the bankruptcy court’s order that appointed the
future claimants’ representative limited the scope of his representation to only claims against
Johns-Manville, and not against Johns-Manville’s insurers.72 The court further explained that
Parra cited no authority and provided no compelling reason why the representative would be
authorized to represent Parra with respect to claims against Johns-Manville, but not against the
settling insurers, in this case, Marsh.73 The court determined that because the future claimants’
representative represented Parra against both Johns-Manville and Johns-Manville’s insurers
(such as Marsh), and because the future claimants’ representative received constitutionally
sufficient notice, Parra therefore received proper due process.74
II.

1986 Orders are not a bar to future claims against Johns-Manville’s insurers
In contrast, in a case in which the plaintiffs were permitted to bring a cause of action

against one of Johns-Manville’s insurers,75 Travelers,76 the plaintiffs were essentially allowed to
do so because as a matter of state law, Travelers owed an independent duty to the plaintiffs. The

70

See id. at 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (admitting Parra was a “future asbestos claimant”
whose interests were within the scope of the future claimants’ representative’s mandate).
71
See id. at 567.
72
See id. at 567 (endowing the representative with full statutory rights and duties of
representation available to an official committee.).
73
Id.
74
See id. at 567-68.
75
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2008).
76
“Travelers is defined as The Travelers Indemnity Company, Travelers Casualty and Surety
Company, Travelers Property Casualty Corp., Citigroup Inc., The Travelers Insurance Company,
Travelers Life and Annuity Company, and each of their respective direct or indirect parents,
subsidiaries, and sister companies, as well as each of their respective predecessors, successors,
assigns, officers, and directors.
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plaintiffs were not claiming against the res of the Manville estate, but rather were seeking
damages against Travelers, unrelated to Manville’s insurance policy proceeds.77
The plaintiffs were comprised of two groups, one suing on the basis of statutory
regulation of insurance practices, and the other suing on the basis of common law claims.
Together, the plaintiffs alleged that Travelers acquired knowledge about the dangers of asbestos
from as early as the 1950s and influenced Johns-Manville’s purported failure to disclose
knowledge about asbestos risks.78 The plaintiffs contended Travelers engaged in a conspiracy in
violation of state law, and that Travelers violated alleged duties to disclose asbestos-related
information.79 Plaintiffs’ argument rested on the belief that the bankruptcy court was lacking
jurisdiction to enjoin third-party non-debtor suits against Travelers.80 The core of the plaintiffs’
allegations centered on the belief that the bankruptcy court failed to distinguish between claims
that seek recovery directly from Travelers based on Travelers distinct and independent acts, and
those classic “Direct Actions” that seek recovery from an insurer contractually obligated to
indemnify Johns-Manville for Johns-Manville’s misconduct.81
On appeal to the district court, the district court considered two issues. The first issue was
whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the statutory and common law claims. The
district court found that the bankruptcy court did have jurisdiction over these claims, as the
bankruptcy court intentionally used broad language in the 1986 Orders so as to cover Direct
Action suits, which would be necessary in order to induce Travelers to contribute to the Manville

77

In re Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F.3d at 52.
See id. at 57.
79
See id.
80
See id. at 60.
81
See id.
78
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Trust.82 The second issue the district court considered was whether the 1986 Orders themselves
were a proper exercise of jurisdiction over non-debtors, and found that the bankruptcy court has
subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin Direct Action claims because it affects the property of the
estate.83
The Second Circuit distinguished the claim made in MacArthur from the statutory and
common law claims brought by the plaintiffs. The court stated that even Travelers admitted that
the statutory and common law claims sought damages from Travelers unrelated to the policy
proceeds, whereas in MacArthur, the plaintiffs sought indemnification or compensation for the
misconduct of Johns-Manville, to be paid out of Johns-Manville’s insurance policies.84
Furthermore, the claims here were based on Traveler’s own bad acts, not those based on JohnsManville’s conduct.85 The court determined that the issue of whether Travelers had a duty to the
Direct Action plaintiffs was based on state law, and neither the district court nor the bankruptcy
court looked to the laws of the states to determine if Travelers had an independent legal duty to
the plaintiffs.86 Because the plaintiffs sought to recover from Travelers for Travelers own
wrongs, the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction over the settlement claims.
The plaintiffs raised no claims against Johns-Manville’s insurance coverage, and
therefore had no claim against Johns-Manville’s bankruptcy assets. Thus, there was no

82

See id. at 61 (finding it “reasonable to interpret the 1986 Orders as giving Travelers such broad
protection against Direct Action Suits to induce it to contribute funds to the Manville trust, which
was key to the confirmation of the Manville [Bankruptcy] Plan.”)
83
See id. (stating that “[s]uits that seek direct recovery authorized by state statutes from
Travelers' insurance policies would reduce the estate's recovery from those policies, thus
affecting the ‘property of the estate.’”)
84
See id. at 63.
85
See id.
86
See id.
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bankruptcy court jurisdiction to enjoin the Direct Action claims against Travelers.87 The court
further explained that it was inappropriate for the bankruptcy court to enjoin claims brought
against third-party non-debtors solely because of a third-party’s financial contribution to a
debtor’s estate. If that were allowed, “a debtor could create subject matter jurisdiction over any
non-debtor third-party by structuring a plan in such a way that it depended upon third-party
contributions.”88 The Second Circuit therefore determined that the bankruptcy court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute.89
Conclusion
The Johns-Manville litigation has seemingly become law of its own kind, setting new
precedent through both legislation and case law. 11 U.S.C.A § 524(g) was enacted in response to
the bankruptcy court’s actions in early proceedings of the In re Johns-Manville cases. The
legislation centers around a unique form of supplemental injunctive relief provided to an
insolvent debtor faced with the specialized problems and difficulties of asbestos liability.90 The
sampling of Johns-Manville related cases above discuss the 1986 Injunctive Orders and the
ability to sue Johns-Manville insurers when faced with those orders.
The outcome seems two pronged, focusing on (1) whether a possible claim to be pursued
falls within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court which issued the 1986 Orders, and (2) if a
claim does fall within the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, whether the claim violates the 1986
orders. The court will likely bar a new complaint as within the jurisdiction of the 1986 Orders if
it relates to Johns-Manville’s misconduct, insurance, or insurance policy as part of the estate.
However, if a complaint is divorced from Johns-Manville’s conduct or its related insurance, and
87

See id. at 65.
In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 228 (3d Cir. 2004).
89
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F.3d 52, 66 (2d Cir. 2008).
90
See id. at 67.
88
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is a claim against the independent action of an insurance provider, it is likely not within the
jurisdiction governing the 1986 Orders. Therefore, the ability to bring a new suit related to
asbestos conduct will likely turn on whether the wrongdoings originated from Johns-Manville or
its insurer in relation to its insurance coverage, or based on the separate wrongdoings of a JohnsManville insurance provider independent from its insurance coverage.
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